

Verrat in der Normandie

*Friedrich
Georg*

Eisenhowers deutsche Helfer



GRABERT

Entschieden hochstehender Verrat und die Angst vor Hitlers Bombe, wie unsere Welt heute aussieht? Seit über 60 Jahren schwieg die Geschichtsschreibung über die brisanten Hintergründe und Folgen der Invasion in der Normandie im Sommer 1944. Nun wurde das Tabu gebrochen. In seinem brisanten Buch beantwortet Friedrich Georg folgende Fragen:

- Warum landeten die Alliierten am 6. Juni 1944 nach jahrelangem Zögern in größter Eile und unter Inkaufnahme extremer Risiken in der Normandie?
- Warum wurden die unblutigeren Alternativen übergangen?
- Hatten die Deutschen das größte Kriegsgeheimnis der Alliierten geknackt?
- Gibt es überzeugende Hinweise auf eine gut-organisierte Verschwörung von hochstehenden deutschen Offizieren mit dem Ziel eines alliierten Invasionserfolges?
- Welche Rolle spielten Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, Feldmarschall Erwin Rommel und der spätere NATO-Oberbefehlshaber Hans Speidel wirklich?
- Wurde die deutsche Niederlage künstlich herbeigeführt, oder war sie nur eine Folge der materiellen Überlegenheit der Alliierten?
- Bestand eine Koordination mit dem Zusammenbruch der Heeresgruppe Mitte an der Ostfront?
- Wo blieben Hitlers Geheimwaffen wie V-1, Düsenflugzeuge und Magnetminen?
- War die Angst der Amerikaner vor Hitlers Atom-bombe berechtigt?
- Wollte sich eine der Siegermächte die alleinige Kontrolle über die deutsche Hochtechnologie im Überraschungsschlag aneignen?
- Was hat es mit dem ›Kampf um die Zeit‹ zwischen Deutschland und den Alliierten auf sich?
- Wovor hatte Churchill bis zum Kriegsende Angst?

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GRABERT

Frederick George

Treason

in the Normandy

Eisenhower's German helpers

A On June 6, 1944, on the coasts of the Normandie an epoch-making event, the importance of which can probably only be compared with the outcome of the Battle of Waterloo. In 1944, after years of argument and hesitation, the British and Americans made their landing on the continent in great haste. Even a risk of failure of 50 percent was accepted. Eisenhower was arguably the only World War II general who could lose an entire war in one day. In fact, the Western Allies, who were sober in their calculations, had important reasons for taking this dangerous risk, and 60 years after the end of the war, people are still happy to hang a cloak of silence on them.

D he decision to invade was made by the Allies made easier, since they knew a decisive trump card in their pocket: when on 6. When the Allied invasion of France (Operation Overlord) began on June 1, 1944, the German defenders, who knew about the preparations for the invasion and had long expected it, were suddenly blind and deaf. The German reserves, prepared for intervention after long-prepared alarm plans, were deployed one after the other, completely belatedly and chaotically, and it took weeks to establish a central command for the actions of the Wehrmacht, SS, Luftwaffe and Navy on the western front in France.

In the last few days before 'D-Day', instead, there had been no hesitation in moving important forces away from Normandy in the greatest haste. The precise German military machine that successfully fought defensive battles against the Allies in Italy in the spring of 1944 in far less favorable conditions

balance of power had delivered, got completely out of step and failed. Mistakes followed mistakes, especially at the command level. although

When sufficient supplies were available, it could hardly reach the fighting troops, and the new weapons intended for defense against invasion were either not used or used incorrectly. How did it come about that two entire branches of the armed forces, the Air Force and the Navy, failed or were wasted senselessly? Despite everything, the German defenders held off the Western Allies in a desperate eighty-day battle before final defeat fell upon them.

D This sounds all the more astonishing than the German one. Main power had to wait idly by the end of July 1944, gun at heel for an alleged second Allied invasion in the Pas-de-Calais, which never came. The Allied Commander-in-Chief in Europe, General Eisenhower, reported after the war that their own losses in France had been far higher than expected. Was it organized treason and sabotage by high and highest German officers that made the landing possible in the first place?

friedrich Georg indicates partially for those affected. There are quite tragic examples of how not everything went right in Normandy. The real reasons for the success of the Normandy landings and the Allied victory have never been discussed publicly, too many would have had something to lose. Yet this mixture of military-economic and technological interests with high-level treachery has cost hundreds of thousands of lives on both sides. Instead of the expected German collapse, the months following the successful landing saw the bloodiest phase of the Second World War for large parts of Europe, claiming more victims and destruction than the entire previous five years of the war. The author proves that the rapid advances in German

side in matters of nuclear weapons, the Allies caused the time of landing to be fixed earlier than planned and the landing at the Normandy coasts held in Provence or to be carried out in the Balkans.

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Frederick George

Treason in the Normandy

Eisenhower's
German helpers



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introduction

Surprised, blind and deaf to the war decision?

N After years of dispute and hesitation, the English undertook and Americans in great haste in 1944 their landing on the continent. Even a risk of failure of 50 percent was accepted. In fact, the Western Allies, who were sober in their calculations, had important reasons for taking this dangerous risk, over which, sixty years after the end of the war, the cloak of silence is still said to be happily draped. The decision to invade was made easier for the Allies because they knew they had a crucial trump card in their pocket:

When the Allied invasion of France (Operation Overlord) began on June 6, 1944, the German defenders, who knew about the preparations for the invasion and had long expected it, were suddenly blind and deaf. Most of them were, as the English put it, 'surprised in their underpants'.

Even as reports of the landing became more and more concrete, the German leadership continued to hesitate to believe in an invasion at this hour and on this stretch of coast.

The German reserves, prepared for intervention after long-prepared alarm plans, were deployed one after the other completely late and chaotically, and it took weeks to establish a central command for the actions of the Wehrmacht, SS, Luftwaffe and Navy on the western front in France.

The precise German military machine, which had successfully delivered defensive battles to the Allies in Italy in the spring of 1944 with a far unfavorable balance of power, got completely out of step and failed. Errors followed errors, especially at the command level.

Despite everything, the German defenders held off the Western Allies in a desperate eighty-day battle before final defeat fell upon them.

On the day of the invasion alone, more than 12,000 Allied and 7,000 German soldiers died, with the exact Allied losses being a well-kept secret in army archives to this day

1 Volker GREMLER,
"Bollwerk am Meer", in:
DWJ 06/06 p.140-143.

The Allied Commander-in-Chief in Europe, General EISENHOWER, reported after the war that their own losses in France had been far higher than expected. As early as July 1944, the Americans had fired ammunition contingents on the Normandy front that had only been planned for 1946. In other theaters of war, supplies had to be rationed in favor of the invading forces, the Allies' situation was so tense. But EISENHOWER also said: "Our best weapon was the German leadership, which acted against all the rules of the art of war." It was precisely here that a breathtaking chain of evidence was gathered that there was more to it than coincidence. An Allied post-war judgment then also wrote: "Seen from the man and from the fighting front, one cannot say that we won the battle of Normandy through tactical superiority."¹ Organized betrayal by high-ranking German officers made the success of the landing possible in the first place did?

¹ See report by General EISENHOWER on the heavy US losses in the Battle of France ("The Marshall Report", in: *The New York Times*, 15. October 1945).

The real reasons for the Normandy landings and the Allied victory have never been discussed publicly, too many would have had something to lose. Yet this mixture of military, economic and technological interests with high-level betrayals has cost hundreds of thousands of lives on both sides.

New insights resulting from the release of secret Russian archives, from reports by military scientists, memoirs by those involved and critical studies by experts therefore require a completely new perspective on the invasion, the success of which has shaped Europe's image to this day.



Chapter 1

**Did everything happen with
the right things in Normandy?**

Royal Marines reach
Calvados Beach. Inhibiting and
paralyzing measures taken by the
German commanders in the first
hours of the Allied invasion - i.e.
sabotage - ensured that the various
landing operations went ahead
without the expected resistance.

›D-Day‹ – Victory or Destruction?

The successful invasion of France in June 1944 is an event that continues to affect our world to this day.

By spring of that year it was already clear to those involved on both sides of the front that the decision was about to be taken. This is how General JODL spoke in his speech to the Reich Cabinet on May 5, 1944 about the importance of the upcoming great battle in France: »Today we are facing the major landing of the western powers and thus before the decisive factors for the outcome of this war and for the future Battle. For us, the path is clearly marked; either victory or annihilation awaits us. I face the fight with full confidence. A defensive victory will change the military and political situation from the ground up, because such a landing, which has been prepared in every detail for years, cannot simply be repeated, not to mention the internal political effects in England and America.«¹ The Kriegsmarine Naval War Staff wrote in a report dated June 6

1 Quoted from:
Heinz SCHMOLKE, *The War Decision. The treason in Normandy? 944*,
Historia, Horb 2004, p.

June 1944 at the beginning of the invasion: »The war has entered its decisive phase for Germany. Once again there is the possibility of bringing about a quick decision in the war by means of a short but powerful battle. That this is in fact a major, decisive operation against Western Europe is beyond question!'' If the invasion succeeded, it would involve the Germans in a land war on a second main front, their recurring nightmare since 1914.

Shortly before the invasion, Field Marshal ROMMEL was confident that he would be able to repel the Allied attack. He expressed the opinion that the Allies would not be able to make another attempt so quickly.

In fact, had the invasion failed, it would not have been possible to repeat it for a long time.

The Germans would then have their armored divisions on the Eastern Front relocate and thus be able to prevent the collapse of the "Army Group Center" with the greatest probability. Above all, the tank reserves were missing here, which, hidden in the orchards and forests of France, were waiting for the Western Allies to land.

The Western Allies also knew what was at stake. The high moral goal of a ›liberation of Europe‹ is used today as the main motif CHUR

CHILLs and ROOSEVELTs widely accepted, but fall far short. Even at the greatest risk, they had to land on the European continent as quickly as possible to avert a deadly threat. That is probably why the Allies called the invasion day "D-Day - the day of decision".

The awkward questions don't want to be silenced

In the last few decades, established historiography has attempted to make it clear from the outset that the story of the Normandy invasion was a triumph for Western Allied warfare technology. The Germans could not oppose the quantitative and qualitative superiority of the Americans and British, and the battle was lost before it even began.

No operation of World War II was so carefully planned as the invasion of the north coast of France. No operation could compare to her in the amount of people and material that was put at risk here. Nevertheless, the risk of a total failure of the invasion was exceedingly great. In the spring of 1944, General Walter BEDELL SMITH, who as Chief of Staff of the Western Allied Commander-in-Chief must have known exactly what it was, estimated the chances of holding the bridgehead to be established at only 50 percent!

In fact, the Battle of Normandy ended in complete German defeat. Soon after the end of the war, however, the question arose again and again as to whether everything had gone right. Would everything have turned out differently if the German defense had known the place of landing and the time of the attack? It becomes almost incomprehensible when one assumes that the Germans had deciphered this greatest war secret of the Allies and still did not use this knowledge.

Why weren't the provided German armored reserves allowed used in a timely manner?

War veterans on the German side repeatedly reported apparently "inexplicable incidents" in which the practiced German military machine, which until recently had worked flawlessly, failed at crucial moments.

For decades nobody could or wanted to ask whether there was a connection between these events. This work-up has now been attempted.

CONFIDENTIAL

The lack of qualified personnel and changes in location and requirements of using agencies calls for the reexamination of present document distribution procedures. This shortage of personnel, which materially reduces the effectiveness of Document Centers and restricts detailed listing and study of documents, has also affected the using agencies. While formerly it was possible for the using agencies to take out large collections of documents on loan, in order to determine and locate papers of interest, it is no longer possible for many of these agencies to do this without withdrawing documents from circulation for considerable periods of time. Consideration must be given to possible methods of pre-screening of collections, which would permit a more rapid circulation among using agencies.

It is also necessary for this conference to consider the overall problem of the denial of certain archives, records, and papers to the Germans. Serious consideration must be given to plans for the organized destruction of papers which possess no value for the Allies, and which must be denied to the Germans. We must be cognizant at all times of the final disposition of documents required for study in Germany which must not be permitted to fall into German hands after the departure of occupation forces. In connection with this we wish to explain Group C.C., USFET and War Department action in asking for the complete withdrawal from quadrupartite consideration of a proposed directive for the handling of captured documents. This directive which was based on the suggestion of certain British archivists would have "frozen" most documents "in situ" and seriously delayed the program of final clean-up in Germany. In asking for the withdrawal the American member of the council was requested to state that the American Government was reconsidering the question and proposed to submit another paper at some future date. The question was then coordinated with the War Department and they were asked to prepare a draft of State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee views on documents which should be destroyed, or to which the Germans were to be denied all future access. This paper, which is to be incorporated into theater views, is to be submitted for quadrupartite action.

All consideration for changes in standard operating procedures must nevertheless bear in mind American responsibility for implementation of existing Anglo-American agreements and quadrupartite commitments which must be complied with at all times.


Plan for Conference.

The Conference will be organized into a Governing Committee and appropriate Sub-committees. Sub-committees are to be formed to deal with individual items of the agenda. Preliminary committees designated by the temporary conference chairman have assembled pertinent data on the major agenda topics for the convenience of sub-committees dealing with those subjects. The interim reports are intended as a guide for the sub-committees. The Governing Committee, composed of representatives of the War Department, G-2, United States Forces, European Theater, Director of Intelligence, Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), and members of the Army and Austria Document Centers, will review Sub-committee reports and recommendations. These will be incorporated into the final report and recommendations of the conference. Representatives at the Conference will then obtain concurrence or comments from their respective organizations. The plan will then be carried into execution by appropriate action of the Theater Commander and the A.C. of S., G-2, War Department.

S. F. GRONLUND
Lt Col GSC
Conference Chairman

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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES



Destroyed Truth

Previously dismissed only as fantasies, this official US document from the

NARA (National Archives and Records Administration) proves that after their victory the Allies organized conference-style actions to destroy confiscated documents that were intended for the

otherwise been useful to Germans would be.

Contributing to the resulting one-sided historical distortion were Allied resolutions at the same conference to ensure that key documents that could be important to the Germans but should not be destroyed were withheld from the Germans forever and ever.

(Source: *Report: German Documents Conference*, RG40, Entry 75, Box 62, p. 5)

Certainly many former combatants could not have imagined that high-ranking German personalities were actively working towards the downfall of their own comrades. In addition, some of the high-ranking German officers in command in Normandy later took over important command posts in the new 'North Atlantic Alliance'. So it was better not to ask unnecessary questions.

›Gestapo-Müller‹ Confessions




SS Obergruppenführer
Heinrich MÜLLER.

In 1948, James Speyer KRONTHAL, as a CIA resident in Bern (code name ›Wellborn II‹), conducted interviews with the former head of the dreaded Gestapo, SS-Obergruppenführer Heinrich MÜLLER. The point was to clarify possible cooperation between MÜLLER and the Americans in the fight against 'world communism' in the post-war period.

When KRONTHAL MÜLLER was questioned about the events of July 20, 1944, the former Gestapo chief said: "Just as a side note, much of the poor German military behavior in France after the invasion was due to deliberate attempts by the conspirators and their friends in order to capitulate to the western powers or to let the Americans and the English pass through the front so that they could reach Germany before the Russians. Military units were held back from fighting and all sorts of contacts with the Allied side were initiated.«

It remains to be seen whether these statements by one of the most feared men of the Third Reich, which became known in 1995, were claims made by a cynical secret service man who did not want to accept that the Allies won the war in a 'normal' way, or whether they were here an insider divulged intimate details of the interrogation results he, as head of the Gestapo, had wrested from the unfortunate victims of July 20, 1944.¹

¹ Gregory DOUGLAS, 'Gestapo Chief'. *The 1948 Interrogation of Heinrich Müller*, James Bender 1995, vol. 1, p. 178.



Chapter 2

Prelude to drama

The Allies knew from the outset the crucial role their air force would play in Operation Overlord and – in contrast to the German leadership – stepped up their preparations accordingly. Here: US 8th Air Force camp (with Chevrolet tractor).

The great German chance or: the balance of power at the beginning of the landing

The Allied invasion forces had provided 130,500 men for their landing in France. From this force, 20,000 men were to land with the first wave on June 6, 1944, which was to be reinforced to 107,000 men by the evening of June 7, 1944.

The Allies' trump cards were their supremacy in the air and at sea. But would all of this be enough?

If one compares the strength of the German defenders, the 7th German Army alone, which was directly affected by the invasion, had 124,358 men at its disposal. This would have given the Germans a considerable numerical superiority over the still weak landing troops. Of these, 57,653 men were in the stationary coastal defense divisions.

This was already slightly more than the Allies wanted to land with their first wave on June 6th. In addition there were 10,555 men from the 91st LL (airborne division) and 56,150 men from the three armored divisions.¹ This makes it clear that the German defenders in Normandy had the numerical superiority in the initial phase, as well as a qualitative superiority in the area of the army armament via the Allies (keywords: ›Tiger tank‹, ›Späh tank‹, ›Achtfachflak‹, ›Panzerfaust‹), the German high command would only have had to ensure that everyone was alerted in good time at the beginning of the landing and that it after that there was a rapid concentration of armored forces.

In this case, one would have had already in the morning hours of the 6th June 1944 will most likely be able to throw the enemy back into the sea, as was also planned by the Führer Headquarters and Field Marshal ROMMEL. The Allied air and sea forces could only have mitigated this, but not prevented it to.

But then it was to be very different.

Completely left to their own devices, the few native German infantry divisions in the front positions almost succeeded in bringing the invasion to a halt in the first sensitive phase.

¹ Heinz SCHMOLKE, *The War Decision. Treason in Normandy*, Historia, Horb 2004, p.42.

Dept. 1: What did the Germans know about the place and time of the planned invasion?


The chances of repelling the landing operation would be greatly improved if the Germans could calculate the time and place of the invasion.

Revealed and known?

Major concerns on the Allied side in May 1944

By April 1944, the British and American secret services were able to report to their commanders that all German reinforcements of the Atlantic Wall were assigned to the 15th Army north of the Seine. Suddenly everything changed! In May 1944, the Allied secret services suddenly noticed the increase in rail traffic between the Seine and the Loire, and the transfer of the Panzer Lehr Division and the 21st Panzer Division to the Caen and Lemont area was decisive. The Wehrmacht's powerful 116th Panzer Division lay on either side of the Seine west of Paris, and the 12th SS Panzer Division "Hitlerjugend" lay near Louviers, all within easy reach of the landing beaches between Le Havre and Cherbourg. There were other events after that, all of which indicated that the Germans were aware of and complied with Allied intentions to land in Normandy

Formation of the German armed forces in Normandy, as of April 1944. From JANUSZ PIEKALKIEWICZ, *Die Invasion France 1944*, Südwest, Munich 1979.



corresponding lineups met. An infantry division and an elite paratrooper regiment were deployed to the Cotentin peninsula, exactly where two US airborne divisions were to be deployed. At the same time, the 5th German Parachute Division was ordered to Rennes.

Even though the main German reinforcements were still in the Pas-de-Calais, it was clear that the Germans had information that made the risk in Normandy increasing by the day.

After years of fighting, German knowledge of the Allies' overall strategy, strengths and weaknesses was very good, and what would happen if Hitler had exact knowledge of, for example, the place and time of the planned landing in Western Europe?

A secret that was no longer a secret

Since October 1943, German defenses had been counting on the Allies to invade French territory. Agents such as Elyasa BAZNA ('Cicero') and Mathilde CARRÉ ('La Chatte') provided insightful information from diplomatic circles and channels of the resistance movement. What was striking were the many individual Allied actions, apparently carried out to cause confusion: commando operations against the Norwegian coast, track blasts in Jutland, the landing of a corpse in an English officer's uniform and fake papers by the submarine Seraph not far from the southern Spanish port of Huelva (O operation ›Mincemeat‹).¹

The SS spy 'Cicero' also managed to microfilm the location of the planned invasion. Exactly how these were is still a matter of debate today. However, HITLER suddenly brought the term 'Normandy' into play during discussions ...

As far as the landing date was concerned, the German High Command took only references to 'May or June' from a document photocopied by BAZNA . This was in line with the commitments made by the Anglo-Saxon heads of government in Tehran. The exact date had to remain unknown because General EISENHOWER was not to set it until twenty-four hours before the landing maneuvers began. The haste with which the Allies moved also showed that the Allied invasion plan was not finalized until April 7, 1944 by Field Marshal MONTGOMERY.²⁻⁴ As we shall see later, there were good reasons.

1 Hellmuth Gunther DAHMS, *The Second World War*, Rainer Wunderlich, Tübingen 1960, p. 433.

2 Oskar REILE, *The German Secret Service in World War II. West Front*, Weltbild, Augsburg 1989, p. 341 f. 350 f.

3 Janusz PIEKALKIEWICZ, *The Invasion of France 1944*, Südwest, Munich 1979, p. 107.

4 Paul CARELL, *they are coming! The invasion of 1944*, Ullstein, Berlin

1997, p. 18

Secret to this day: did the transatlantic telephone connections reveal the time and place of the landing?

During the Second World War, there were two little-known intelligence services in Germany that specialized in the use of telephone calls. These were the 'Research Office' (FA of the Reich Ministry of Aviation) and the 'Research Center' of the Reichspost (FFST./DRP). To this day, their findings are shrouded in secrecy.

After the research center of the German Reichspost had already been able to completely record the transatlantic telephone connections between England and the USA on magnetophone devices in the course of 1941, they could be deciphered almost regularly from March 1942 until the end of the war. Despite the insulation of the cable, the high-frequency currents running in the cable were caught as short waves and converted into letters in an extremely complicated operation. The documents with the recorded conversations were first sent by telex, later only by courier by plane to Berlin. The recipient of the documents in the Reich capital was the Reich Security Main Office. The transcripts of numerous telephone calls recorded in the Atlantic are available from the Reichspost's 'Research Center'. However, they do not contain any particularly important facts. It must be assumed that the recordings of all

politically and militarily important telephone conversations were removed by the British, who in 1945 had captured the relevant German archives. In US archives, documents on wiretapping transcripts from the Reichspost research center are generally not accessible, although leading officials from this agency were interned and interrogated by the Americans in 1945.¹ Not even their interrogation records can be found. Here, too, it must be assumed that the American documents, which are certainly available, are not published because leading US politicians transmitted embarrassing information during transatlantic telephone calls.

¹ Herbert FAENSEN,
High tech for Hitler, Chr.
Links, Berlin 2001, p. 107 ff.

For example, on November 26, 1941, a German listening station in Holland recorded a conversation between ROOSEVELT and CHURCHILL about the impending Japanese "surprise attack" on Pearl Harbor. On November 28, HITLER already informed the Reich leadership that Japan was about to enter the war. the

Attack then took place on December 7, 1941. No one had warned the US fleet of the danger at Pearl Harbor

If the work of the research center was communicated to the highest German leadership in good time, it was of crucial importance for the war. Thus it is known that a telephone conversation between ROOSEVELT and CHURCHILL on July 29, 1943 was recorded, in which the two statesmen openly discussed Italy's request for an armistice. Thus, long before EISENHOWER announced the conclusion of the armistice treaty with Italy on September 8, 1943, the German leadership was in a position to prepare for the Axis case and to prepare for the occupation of Italy in the event of an Italian withdrawal from the war.² What was it like? in the case of the Normandy invasion? In Walter SCHELLENBERG's memoirs, the head of the former German secret service gives us a hidden clue in 1956: »The high point of our listening was a conversation between CHURCHILL and ROOSEVELT at the beginning of 1944, which gave us valuable conclusions - it resulted in an increase in military activities England and gave hints about the imminent invasion of France. If the two people we were talking to had guessed at the time that we were hanging on the line, ROOSEVELT would certainly not have said goodbye so easily with the words: ›Well, we will do our best – now I will go fishing.‹« Walter SCHELLENBERG was allowed to do more in his book, which was scrutinized by the censors in the post-war period.³

After the Russian archives were opened, Valentin FALIN interpreted this more precisely.⁴ The former Soviet Russian ambassador in Germany FALIN referred to Walter SCHELLENBERG's story about the transatlantic cable that was tapped and wrote that the German intelligence had lost the information about the place and time of the invasion (on 6 .or 7 June in Normandy or Brittany).

In contrast to the previous year, when the research authorities gave the Germans a decisive period of preparation, which thwarted the Allied plans, everything went differently in 1944: Russian post-war sources report that German radio reconnaissance allegedly "failed" to realize their sensational Passing on knowledge about the instances! To this day it is not known who left this message – the potentially decisive importance of the war, even the humblest soldier should have been aware of. But it is also possible that the delivering courier suddenly had an 'accident' and never arrived

¹ Mansur KHAN, *The Secret History of the American Wars*, Grabert, Tübingen 32003, pp. 194-225.

² Gregory DOUGLAS, *Gestapo Chief. The 1948 Interrogation of Heinrich Müller*, Vol. 1, pp. 42-5 James Bender 1995.

³ Walter SCHELLENBERG, *Notes*, Limes 1979, p. 339 f.

⁴ Valentin FALIN, *Second Front. The Conflicts of Interest of the Anti-Hitler Coalition*, Knaur, Munich 1997, pp. 424 and 46.



WALTER SCHELLENBERG (1910-1952). After the fall of V R I S 1944 he took over the defense.

and/or that the text has been manipulated. In fact, from an unknown point in time, Berlin demanded that the texts that had been bugged should no longer be transmitted in German translation but in the original English version. A clear sign of distrust.

¹ Günther W. GELLER
MANN, ... *and listened*
for Hitler, Bernard &
Graefe, Bonn 1991, p.
11 f., 38 and 105-108.

An impenetrable curtain of silence has fallen over these events, which has been accepted without complaint by participants from both former warring parties.

Airborne evidence was not lacking: did the Luftwaffe recognize the invasion target as early as April 1944?


Today, in the history of the Second World War, the opinion is held that from the beginning of 1944 it was no longer possible for German aerial reconnaissance to undertake photo flights over England. Totally blind to what was happening in England, the Germans could have been misled by Allied deception. In fact, as early as April 1944, evidence of the direction of the invasion was available.

In fact, British air defenses had reached a level of sophistication that made a regular reconnaissance mission by conventional German aircraft seem like a suicide mission. Even the high-altitude command 'Beauvais' had to idly push its Junkers Ju 86R into the old airship hangars of Paris Orly after the appearance of high-altitude fighters of the type 'Supermarine Spitfire'.

However, the German air reconnaissance aircraft were not quite as blind as is often portrayed today. In February 1944, for example, the 3rd Experimental Unit OKL in Paris-Orly succeeded in obtaining an extremely fast twin-engine reconnaissance aircraft, the Arado Ar 240 (registration T9 + GL), which, undamaged, made up to two or three reconnaissance flights daily over the English south coast could graduate. Other deployments of this one-off were to Plymouth, Chatham, Ramsgate and London. In March 1944, however, the machine was loaned to the 1st/F100 reconnaissance squadron on the Eastern Front, where it crashed after a crash landing while returning from a mission Eastern Front was responsible.

² J. Richard SMITH,
Eddie J. CREEK & Peter
PEDRICH, *On Special*
Missions, Classic 2003,
pp. 36-39.

After the loss of this single specimen, the only option left was to fly below the radar screen over the Channel coast



to fly low to England in uncertain weather with the less efficient Me 410 and BF 109 reconnaissance aircraft and to attempt dangerous missions to survey English ports on the fly. A penetration into the English hinterland was impossible for these machines.

Nevertheless, these reconnaissance missions managed to get a reasonably reliable picture of the deployment of the Allied invasion fleet.

Up until the end of April 1944, no particularly noticeable movements of the ship were noted. But then all the indicators pointed to a storm. West of the Isle of Wight, the Luftwaffe discovered massive concentrations of troops. On the 25th of this month, German aerial reconnaissance in the ports of Portsmouth, Selsey and Southampton noted the accumulation of 234 Landing Craft Tank (LCT), 254 smaller vehicles, 170 Landing Craft Infantry (LCI) and 15 transport ships capable of 70,000 soldiers to embark.¹ The invasion fleet had been discovered and it was known where it was likely to go.

This gave the German high command the verifiable fact that the Allies would cross either towards Brittany or Normandy. At this point in time, mining the coastal waters in the threatened landing areas would have been just as possible as postponing intervention

reserves.

Incidentally, there is no evidence that German reconnaissance officers found anything similar in the ports opposite the Pas-de-Calais. The strength of the forces at Dover and Folkestone remained little changed.

According to Otto SKORZENY, German air reconnaissance aircraft photographed long rows of huge rectangles that looked like docks in south-east English ports. In fact, the Germans also discovered the purpose

Arado Ar 240C:

The only reconnaissance aircraft that was able to fly unscathed over


England at the beginning of 1944 had to be handed over to the Eastern Front in March 1944.

Drawing: Friedrich GEC

¹ Geoffrey J. THOMAS and Barry KETLEY,

KG 200, The Luftwaffe Most

Secret Unit, Hikoki 2003, p.



Provision of American troops in the ports of southern England in April 1944 – unmistakable.

this structure. SKORZENY wrote: "Soon we had all the pieces of the

Put together jigsaw puzzles and found that they were prefabricated port facilities... Only the coasts of Normandy seemed particularly suitable for such landing operations.«¹

Would the German high command make use of the knowledge gained under such dangerous circumstances?

Radio traffic and agent reports confirm the picture

In 1944 the German radio monitoring service was able to
To monitor radio traffic almost completely up to the level of London

chen. Of course, it wasn't just news from the London Police and Fire Brigade, but signs of the planned invasion. It was thus clear that intercepted radio traffic made the area between Plymouth and Portsmouth suspect as a base for an invading army.² Opposite this area, however, was not the Pas-de-Calais, but the Cotentin Peninsula.

¹ Otto SKORZENY, *Meine Kommandun terneh-men*, Universitas, Munich 1993, p. 174.

² Jak P. Mallmann SHOWELL, *German Naval Code Breakers*, II to Allan 2003, p. 129.

Agents also reported on a major Allied invasion exercise in the county of Devon in south-west England. When HITLER received this report, he noticed that the flat and open coast

gion of Devon corresponded to that of Normandy.¹ There was something very special about this agent's report.

›Operation Tiger‹ – the invasion by a thread

At the beginning of 1944, the Germans sent a special agent of the SD to England with a captured Boeing B 17 of KG 200. Haar could have scuppered the invasion before it even began.


Gestapo chief General Heinrich MÜLLER reported in 1948.² GÖRING, HITLER and HIMMLER had decided in 1944 that the "problem of the invasion site" should be urgently solved by a special agent. A man was selected who was born in Germany but moved to the United States when he was a small child and studied engineering there. When war broke out, he returned to Germany from the USA via Portugal and, after a career in the Gestapo, joined the Luftwaffe. There he was employed as an interrogation specialist in the Air Force interrogation center in Oberursel. Before joining the Luftwaffe, he had carried out several assignments for the SD and, according to General MÜLLER, the commander of Oberursel, convinced Luftwaffe Colonel KILLINGER to release his man for this mission, which was vital to the war effort.

The agent received a legend as an engineer major and was to serve in England as a staff officer tasked with solving combat engineer equipment problems, visiting the various barracks and camps to see what he could help. To get in touch, he was given a special radio that would communicate with Germany through a high-speed signal. His radio message sounded like a 'random noise' to the Allied defense stations and was almost impossible to intercept. A captured four-engine Boeing B 17

¹ Bernhard ZÜRNER, *Hitler. General against his will?*, Vowinckel, Stegen 2001, p. 216 f.

² Gregory DOUGLAS, *Gestapo Chief. The 1948 Interrogation of Heinrich Müller*, Vol. 3, James Bender 1998, pp. 130-143.

Boeing B 17 G ›Flying Fortress‹ successfully used by the KG 200 over England in the spring of 1944.



G 'Flying Fortress' of the KG 200 finally flew the parachute agent to his operational target at night.

The agent, who successfully jumped off in England, developed a lightning career there. Before long he had discovered that the 'threat of invasion of Norway' was a ruse and by April 1944 he was in Portsmouth on the Channel coast. There he discovered that

war maneuvers were to be held, which US engineer units needed, and his organizational skills soon made him indispensable to the units on the ground.

He learned that the English had set up a backup landing area near Slapton Sands on a small coastal area near East Devon, geographically quite similar to the future invasion area. 3000 residents had to leave the area, which was then taken over by the American V.

Corps was manned. Thereafter, British sappers erected bunkers and other facilities analogous to the German defenses of the Atlantic Wall on the French coast.

Before the SD agent arrived there, two landing exercises 'Operation Duck' (December 1943) and Operation Beaver (March 1944) had already taken place. Operation Beaver, in particular, was denied because of the complete lack of coordination between the various

During maneuvers in
April 1944, British
attack troops stormed a
beach under the eyes of
observers.

From: *D-Day June 6, 1944*, vg,
Cologne 2004.





On a British coast, British armored units are practicing the removal of so-called 'C elements', which were intended to block tanks. Blocking elements of this kind, which used to stand along the Belgian-German border, were positioned on the Normandy coast in April 1944.

From: Janusz PIEKALKIE WICZ, *The Invasion of France 1944*, Südwest, Munich 1979.

involved landing units in connection with confusion in the high command classified as a critical failure.

To eliminate these deficits, "Operation Tiger" was scheduled for the end of April. From April 26, 1944, it was intended to simulate the planned landing of the 4th American Division at Utah Beach in Normandy. The exercise was scheduled to last several days and many important generals, including General EISENHOWER and General BRADLEY, would be in attendance. The agent was able to learn not only the detailed schedule of the landing exercise, but also what buildings would serve as headquarters for high command and when the generals would be there. What an opportunity! The agent sent his findings to Germany and proposed a heavy bombing raid like that against the port of Bari in 1943. Dubbed the 'Pearl Harbor of the Mediterranean', this attack devastated Allied supplies of poison gas destined to be shipped to the Italian front. General MÜLLER wrote that somehow this message had not reached the right people in the Luftwaffe and so no action was taken. As we shall see later, this omission is likely to

It was no coincidence that a large-scale raid by the German Air Force in April 1944, which was still possible in the west, hit the Allied High Command hard. As I said, the invasion would have been in jeopardy before it even started.

The planes necessary for this surprise attack were at the IX. Air Corps available.


For its part, the Kriegsmarine decided to act immediately and sent its speedboats to Lyme Bay on the second day of the exercise. In a surprise attack, four of the five participating large LSTs ('Landing Ship Tank') were torpedoed, killing hundreds of Allied soldiers and sailors.

The Allied LST reserve no longer existed afterwards! This was all the more bitter as a severe shortage of these special ships had already forced the Allies to postpone their landing date.

In fact, in addition to their main task of inflicting as much damage as possible on the Allied ships, the German Schnellboote also had a second purpose, serving as intelligence gathering: they brought the corpse of one fished out of the water of Lyme Bay

One of the damaged Capital Landing Ships (LST 289). The number of victims of the tragic maneuver of April 27, 1944 was 749.

From: *D-Day 6/6/44*, vgs, Cologne 2004.



American army officer, on whose body were drenched but legible blueprints for the coming invasion. It also said that Normandy was the main target. According to Gestapo-MÜLLER, the plans were immediately sent to the High Command and may have contributed to forming HITLER's opinion that Normandy would be the Allied target.

It is not the fault of the German special agent that the Normandy invasion succeeded. According to General MÜLLER, the agent himself was never caught. He proved so adept at organizing supplies for the American pioneers that he had to take part in the invasion of France, in which most of his comrades were drowned. After two weeks he managed to break away through the German lines and was nearly shot by his own men.

The Germans awarded him a medal, a promotion and sent him on vacation to a Luftwaffe sanatorium in Austria. According to General MÜLLER, the SD agent survived the war unscathed.

Hitler commits to Normandy, but ...

As early as mid-February 1944, HITLER had repeatedly stated that the Allies would land in Normandy or in Brittany.¹

Despite all Allied attempts to deceive, false reports from the German enemy intelligence service ›Fremde Heere West‹ (Colonel Alexis VON ROENNE)² and contrary to the opinion of Field Marshals VON RUNDSTEDT and ROMMEL, on April 6, 1944, HITLER finally settled on Normandy as the most likely Allied force Invasion sort fixed. Across from General JODL he pointed to the Normandy coast on a large map of France. In the Führer's opinion, after landing on the Normandy coast, the Allies would advance westward between the mouths of the Vire and Orne rivers, cutting off the Cotentin peninsula to capture the port of Cherbourg. According to HITLER's Luftwaffe adjutant, Colonel Nicholas VON BELOW, this information came from documents microfilmed by SS spy 'Cicero', who worked at the British embassy in Ankara. "Why on earth should the English tell their ambassador in Turkey that?" exclaimed HITLER. Known from another "Cicero" document

HITLER the keyword of the invasion: 'Operation Overlord'. This fact

¹ Nicolaus VON BELOW, *Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937-45*, Pour le Mérite, Selent 1999, p. 353.

² Alexis VON ROENNE be still main on the 23rd April 1944, in all seriousness, that the Allied troop concentrations in Iceland and Scotland were the same as those in southern England. This means that central and northern Norway would also be under – wrong! – Danger of invasion. (Howe H.

SAUNDERS, *The Victory Betrayed*, Druffel, Leoni 1984, p. 34)

che was also noted in JODL's diary, but neither HITLER nor the high command had enough trust in their field marshals to reveal the source of their findings. At the briefing on March 4, Hitler merely repeated his alleged "premonition."¹ A crucial mistake, as it turned out.

¹ David IRVING, *Schlacht um Europa, With the courage of despair against the invasion of 1944*, DSZ, Munich 2004, p. 43.

However, HITLER did not find much approval among his generals for his opinion, and so only a few more units were then sent to Normandy for reinforcements, while the main weight of the defense was still concentrated in the Pas-de-Calais.

When will they come? The »riddle« of time of day and tide level of the planned landing

Of paramount importance to the preparations for defense was whether the Allies would undertake their invasion at high tide or low tide, and in daylight or darkness. Allegedly, the German defenders had typed completely wrong here.

In fact, the German radio monitoring service had discovered that the major Allied invasion exercise had begun in England on May 4, 1944, two hours after low tide and in daylight. This was also clearly confirmed by informants. This made it clear that the later landing would probably take place in daylight and at low tide. Admiral KRANCKE, Chief of the Navy in France, repeatedly drew attention to this point.

Yet those responsible on the Canal front fatally stuck to the false maxim that the invasion would only begin at high tide and in the dark.

When the Allied invasion fleet launched coastal bombardments at dawn on June 6, 1944, but no regular landing attempts were detected by sunrise, the Chief of Staff of Army Group B, General Dr. Hans SPEIDEL so convincingly convinced his fellow officers that the commander of the 17th Army went to bed relieved, "because the landing had failed."² Shortly thereafter, the regular disembarkation of the landing troops began— at low tide and in full daylight!

² David IRVING, *Battle for Europe. With the courage of despair against the invasion 194-4*, DSZ, Munich 2004, pp. 60-86 and 99 f.

The German generals should not have been surprised by the landing at low tide, for Field Marshal ROMMEL gave up briefly on June 3rd

before he left for Germany, he issued an important instruction to his commanders, which said: "The enemy has repeatedly tried out invasion exercises at low tide, so that we must seriously reckon with such an undertaking." on the Atlantic Wall should also be prepared for low tide by June 10th.

Conclusion: The thesis, stubbornly advocated for decades by established historians, that the Germans had little contradictory information about the landing area and the time of the attack before June 6, 1944, is no longer tenable.

Secret service efforts, technical interception measures and daring reconnaissance flights had cracked what was probably the enemy's greatest war secret - apart from the atomic bomb. But what use was the knowledge that was so difficult to acquire if it was not applied by those responsible?

Dept. 2: The prevented victory in the ›Secret War‹ or: How German counterintelligence was held back before the invasion

A bad omen for later events: The agent control center for Western Europe is discovered - but must not be attacked.

During the Battle of Normandy, the Germans were amazed at how well informed the Allies were about their own plans. This is how soldiers of the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division "Götz von Berlichingen" found out that key people in the French population in their stationing area knew before they did about the transfer of the unit to the Normandy front decided by the German High Command, and on June 28 After Cherbourg fell in 1944, the victorious American General BARTON proudly showed the German Major KÜPPERS, the commander of the last underground defenses of Cherbourg, his map series, in which the German position system was drawn even more precisely than in the German maps.

The fact was that the Anglo-American intelligence services had obtained all the details of the German coastal defenses even before the invasion began. In addition, over the course of years of development work, a network of more than two thousand had been established across the whole of France

Agents, radio operators and couriers set up. In addition, there were a number of German traitors who acted as informants.

The messages obtained in this way were either sent to England by carrier pigeon, boat or plane or, in urgent cases, radioed in encrypted form to London. As early as the turn of the year 1943/44, the German radio defense observed around 500 located enemy radio operators in their own sphere of influence. Despite the successes on the German side in the levy, their number had steadily increased.

For this reason, the German radio defense wanted the Allies switch off the central beacon in England.

The German radio defense had succeeded in using fast-flying aircraft in risky missions with near-field direction finders on board to locate the control center in England, from which the agent radio operators of the British and Gaullist secret services deployed on the continent were controlled. Therefore, in 1943, the management of the German radio defense made the proposal to destroy the control center located 60 to 80 kilometers north-east of London by an air raid.

However, the superiors of the head of radio defense, Major Ernst VON BARY, rejected his proposal. Why did senior officers in charge of the German counterintelligence not want agent radio communications to be paralyzed?

1 Oskar REILE, *The German Secret Service in World War*

II. Western Front, Weltbild, Augsburg 1989, p. 208 f.


The Germans were aware of all the Resistance's plans in the event of an invasion

The German ›Front reconnaissance III West‹ under its commander, Colonel REILE , had succeeded in finding out in good time before the start of the invasion what tasks the Allied agent groups and the French Resistance would be given in the event of an invasion.² In February 1944, the commands under REILE received the

2 Oskar REILE, *The German Secret Service in World War*

II. Western Front, Weltbild, Augsburg 1989, pp. 343-348 f.

Instruction to incorporate further liaison officers into the agent groups and the structure of the Resistance in addition to the informants who have already been successfully smuggled in, in order to be able to follow exactly what was happening in the enemy groups and structures, in particular whether and what preparations had been made for the invasion would. As early as March 1944, German military counter-espionage had around 35 informants who had successfully joined the Resistance – or agent troops.



The countless acts of sabotage by the French Resistance (here a railway carriage lies across a locomotive) were primarily aimed at interrupting the supply lines and troop movements of the German Wehrmacht.

Already during that month several of these German agents consistently reported the exact wording of the slogans ordering their respective groups over the English BBC to be on alert and to announce the start of the invasion. By the beginning of May, Colonel REILE had been able to clarify the instructions for 26 different agent groups.

Written documents from the informants revealed which traffic routes were to be destroyed in an emergency, where the electricity network was to be paralyzed by sabotage and where ambushes were to be used to disrupt troop movements. Large-scale acts of sabotage against German fuel supplies in France were also planned .

In this way, the plans of the French resistance groups could have been effectively prevented by suitable measures at the beginning of the invasion.

Of course, Colonel REILE reported in detail in writing to all the responsible staff and departments about the wins he had won

new findings, but primarily to the Commander-in-Chief West (Field Marshal VON RUNDSTEDT) and the military commander in France (General VON STÜLPNAGEL). According to his own words, REILE repeatedly presented orally to the responsible gentlemen the facts he had ascertained about the preparations for the invasion on French territory.

However, he then expressed himself as follows: »As far as I know, however, the military commander was not in a position to use sufficient forces to secure the objects in question.

Certainly some other tasks were more important to him in the situation at that time!« Later we will see what REILE wanted to say about VON STÜLPNAGEL .

The possible victory over the Résistance was thus gambled away through 'inaction'.

After the start of the invasion, the Resistance was able to start its activities undisturbed according to plan, which led to numerous obstacles to German troops.

In May 1944 the Germans again had a decisive

Opportunity offered: Major BODINGTON , a member of the SOE ('Special Operations Executive') staff in London, came to France specifically to verbally give the most important leaders of SOE and Résistance groups final instructions for the invasion.

After radioing his arrival, he had a single-engined Lysander drop him off near Fontainebleau at night. One of the German counter-espionage undercover officers was among the chiefs chosen to receive instructions from Major BODINGTON for the invasion.

Colonel REILE received the news of Major BODINGTON 's planned arrival in good time for him to be able to have him arrested along with all the important leaders of the SOE and Resistance groups with whom he wished to meet. But senior officers on the staffs of the Commander-in-Chief West and the Military Commander-in-Chief France took the view that it was better not to make an arrest. So Major BODINGTON should fly back to England after completing his mission. Here, too, the discreet Colonel REILE did not mention the names of the "authoritative officers" responsible.

After the start of the invasion, without prior German countermeasures, Résistance and SOE units, especially in Central and Southern France, multiple successes that forced the German Wehrmacht to postpone planned troop movements and counterattacks

ben. This was particularly the case in the crucial first few days after June 6th. At that time, among other things, two German armored divisions, which were lying south of the Loire, were to be summoned as quickly as possible in order to intervene in the fighting on the invasion front. However, their approach was delayed as a result of road blasts and ambushes.

Consider the case of the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich, which was stationed near Montauban in the Perigord. ›Das Reich‹ was one of HITLER's favorite divisions. HITLER had personally sought out Montauban in the golden south of France where the division could recover from heavy losses sustained in Russia. By D-Day (Invasion Day), the division had grown back to 17,000 men, but supplies of material replacements could never keep up. Their combat vehicle strength was only 44 Panzer IVs, 25 Panthers and 43 Sturmgeschütze, whereas 231 armored vehicles were required by organizational planning.

Nonetheless, the Allies dreaded the division's appearance in Normandy. That's why they had planned special treatment for Das Reich: Already on June 6, one of the best SOE agents and his team managed to destroy most of Das Reich's fuel depots. Allied air fleets also destroyed all the Loire bridges between Or léans and the Atlantic on June 7th. That same night, RAF Lancasters of 617 Squadron Dambusters with 12,000 pound bombs destroyed the Saumur-Partheray railway tunnel which was the last high-speed transport facility for the Das

rich' was. After all rail transport had failed, SS Brigadeführer Heinz LAMMERDING had to move his entire division overland. Military experts are aware that long-distance transports of armored units are best done by rail, since tracked vehicles constantly tend to suffer breakdowns on long road marches because of the excessive stress on the chain links, unless a complex and regular repair he follows. Now came the next problem: Lammerding's fuel supplies would be exhausted before he reached the River Loire, but OB West, Field Marshal Gerd VON RUND STEDT, had promised him a fuel convoy, which was successfully sent to meet him.

But the problems of Das Reich had only just begun. The division's route passed through small valleys, stone villages, and granite outcrop regions in Gascony that were naturally made for ambushes, mine raids, and snipers.

French resistance groups and SOE teams made sure that the SS had to pay in blood for every mile they covered. Tank commanders were shot down while standing in their hatches, tank and armored personnel carrier tracks were ripped away by mines, trucks and their passengers were machine-gunned and left lying on the roadside like war refuse, and small marching groups disappeared without a trace. Day after day, the division bled from a thousand wounds, and its transport casualties were beginning to resemble those of a real battle with regular troops. The attacked division reacted with great bitterness, and every assassination, every murder, every destruction led to massive reprisals. Badly torn and far too late, the Das Reich division finally arrived on the Normandy front to take up position in the Saint-Lô area.

Conclusion: The terrible excesses of partisan warfare on both sides could have been prevented to a large extent if the responsible officers at the "Military Commander France" had taken appropriate protective measures against the plans for the deployment of resistance and agent groups that had become known to them before the invasion began. and trigger preventive measures. They had more important things to do.

Dept. 3: Instead of building up, weakening of the defense in the run-up to the landing

The radio remote mines of the SS

1 Otto SKORZENY,
We fought, we lost,
Helmut Cramer, Lohmar
31975 vol. 2, p. 14 f.

Otto SKORZENY reports in his book *We fought, we lost* ¹ that his staff was thinking about how to make an effective contribution to hindering enemy supplies during the coming invasion. First, SKORZENY asked Admiral HEYE to give him the expert opinion of the High Command of the Navy as to where the invasion was to be expected from a purely nautical point of view. He was given a classified list of ten stretches of coastline, with the Cherbourg Peninsula at the top, with details of possible landing sites No. 1. This prediction, the accuracy of which will become clear later

proved, had certainly also been submitted to all other competent military authorities. It must be asked why they did not want to draw any conclusions from it.

SS Hauptsturmführer VON VÖLKERSAM now worked out an immediate program that could be carried out quickly and in the same order as the assumed landing sites on SKORZENY's behalf. It was suggested that preparations should be made to engage anticipated enemy headquarters and intelligence centers on the endangered stretches of coast. The SS had primarily in mind prepared detonations to be triggered at the right moment of the invasion with the help of new types of radio equipment from their own aircraft or from long-distance cables. Similar tactics had been employed by the Soviets with great success in 1941 during the German advance in the east. At that time, their remote mines claimed great casualties among German staff officers.

This weapon, also known as a radio mine, consisted of large mines weighing up to 1000 kg, which were made up of wooden boxes with explosives each weighing 25 kg. These were connected to one another in at least three places by invisibly laid wires. An 8-tube radio receiver with 12 V batteries and an electric timer (every 3 minutes for around 8 seconds on reception) had previously been tuned to a specific tone length and pitch with the tuning fork. All parts were packed in waterproof rubber bags and installed in the foundations of the target buildings. Defusing them was extremely dangerous, because they were individually secured against attempts to remove them by the rubber bag closure and each other by pull-type detonators. To receive the ignition signal, a 20 to 30 m long wire antenna was usually laid under the road surface, plaster or tiles. Once activated, the igniter stayed operational for about 3 months, longer in warm climates. The range of the receiver was around 300 kilometers.

As I said, the Germans had adopted this weapon from the Russians. When the Germans invaded Russia in 1941/42, the mysterious "radio mine" created fear and uncertainty and claimed great casualties, especially among German staff officers and generals, when important buildings that had long been deep in their own rear suddenly fell through during important conferences and meetings long mysterious mine explosions were completely destroyed.

Another plan of SKORZENYs¹ wanted to station special units from SS fighter units on the endangered sections of the beach



From April 1943, Otto SKORZENY (1908-1975) headed the SS Special Unit ›Oranien

¹ Otto SKORZENY, *Meine Commando* Companies, Universitas, Munich 1993, p. 174

Mission should be commando operations against enemy headquarters and intelligence centers.

In accordance with military official channels, SKORZENY had to submit these plans to the High Command West for approval. After repeated warnings, he received the answer from the "busy" office in Paris: In principle, his plan was certainly correct and feasible. But then came the big 'but', which culminated in the rejection, which SKORZENY tried to reproduce as verbatim as he could remember: 'It cannot be assumed that the necessary preparations for your plan were kept completely secret from the German occupation troops stationed on the coastal strip can become. But any such preparation could destroy the belief in the absolute impenetrability of the Atlantic Wall among these troops. For this reason, therefore, the whole plan must be rejected.' Underneath it, according to SKORZENY, was the usual illegible signature. 'The Rejecters' preferred to remain unknown.

SKORZENY suspected that "certain intentions" were behind the whole thing. He asked meaningfully whether it was not probable that many such lower-level plans were rejected by Paris on similar grounds.



Chapter 3

The invasion succeeds

become man and material
embarked calmly.
German reconnaissance
flights over southern England
were not carried out in the last
preparatory phase of the landing.

Dept. 1: Apparently inexplicable measures taken by the German defenders shortly before landing

May 30, 1944: The planned long-distance bomber attack on the invasion fleet does not take place

By the end of May 1944, the ports on England's south coast were crammed with thousands of warships and landing craft. An air raid on the transport ships, which were filled to the brim with ammunition and petrol, could lead to catastrophe. This did not go unnoticed by German aerial reconnaissance.

For months, the newly formed long-distance bomber unit II./KG 100 had been training in naval combat in Aalborg and Gotenhafen with Heinkel He 177 fighter aircraft. No effort had been spared in setting up a powerful unit. Their long-distance bombers were guarded day and night by a specially set up watch detail. Each machine was assigned three scheduled attendants who had nothing to do but keep the machines operational.

In addition, about 200 highly specialized technicians were added, and the flying personnel were supplemented to such an extent that each crew received two additional men after the replenishment and supplementation. Most of the technicians were sent to the Reich for special courses in order to receive the finishing touches for the tasks to come. Finally the time had come: the entire II. Gruppe of KG 100 was to fly a large-scale surprise attack on the accumulation of ships on the south coast of England. The precisely planned one

set should be supported by lighting technicians from KG 66.

On the evening of May 30, 1944, all machines were ready, loaded and refueled. When the crews had already been waiting in their combinations for four hours for the operational order, a crew member illegally listened to the English "soldiers' radio station Calais" on his radio receiver. After a few beats of upbeat dance music, the broadcaster's announcer addressed KG 100 directly: "And now, comrades from Kampfgeschwader 100, we have to have a chat with you. We know very well that you have been waiting several hours in new combinations for the operational order to come to us. Why don't you come? Are you afraid? It's better that way if you stay at home. You also want to see your wives and parents again. If you should come anyway, we will give you a warm welcome like you have never experienced before. Now how is it, do you want to come?"

1 Ulf BALKE,
Kampfgeschwader 100
 ›Wiking‹, Motorbuch,
 Stuttgart 1981, pp. 295-301.

About two hours later the full-scale attack was called off, as it had become apparent that the enemy had received reliable information about the intended attack.¹ As a result of this betrayal, concentrations of ships in the ports of England's south coast remained German in the crucial last few days before the invasion unmolested by air raids.

The crews of the IL/KG 100 were later pointlessly decimated in individually flown night missions against the heavily defended bridgehead in Normandy.

The betrayal of planned large-scale air force operations against England was not an isolated case. In 1945, for example, the attack on the English fleet in Scapa Flow with Mistel planes (cancelled) and the long-distance fighter attack on English bomber bases "Unternehmen Gisela" (carried out nonetheless) were reported to the Allies by German informants.

Why were the German fighters withdrawn two days before the invasion?

In wars it is common to reinforce air force formations in threatened areas. Shortly before the invasion, the German Air Force High Command withdrew the last fighter squadrons from Normandy. The alleged main reason for the transfer was that the hunters were urgently needed to defend the Reich. The same argument was used to move supplies and maintenance goods that had already been carefully stored away from French airfields back to the Reich.

On June 4, 1944, the Germans possessed 183 Tag fighter planes throughout France. Of these, 160 were operational, and of these no fewer than 124 FW 190s were withdrawn that afternoon. This was the well-known Fighter Squadron 26.

However, he was not transferred back to the Reich, but to Reims and Nancy - and in great haste.

As early as May 15, the 2nd Group of Fighter Wing 26 had been withdrawn from Normandy to Mont-de-Marsan in south-western France.

Oddly enough, the published literature prevails a ›blank spot‹ when it comes to the events of June 4th.²

The transfer took place so quickly that the commander of the Jagdgeschwader complained to his superior: "That's hel

2 This event is completely omitted from the excellent book *The JG 26 War Diary*, Vol. 2, by American historian Donald Caldwell (Grub Street 1996).

madness! If we're expecting an invasion, squadrons need to come, not go! And what should happen if the attack occurs during the transfer? My floor organization can be at the new location as early as tomorrow or the day after tomorrow! Are you all crazy?"¹⁻³

When Josef PRILLER did not want to give in any further, he received the abrupt reply that as a simple squadron commander (!) he had no idea of the overall situation. That rude person was Major General JUNCK, the commander of the II Jagdkorps. JUNCK said that PRILLER could not judge from the point of view of a squadron commander what would result in the great state development.

That's what it was all about: The "great state development," what did purely military historical points play a role?

Only two Focke-Wulf FW 190 A-8s of Jagdgeschwader 26 were still there on June 6, 1944, Colonel PRILLER's machine and that of his comrade Sergeant WODARCZYK. On the day of the invasion, the two then flew their mission made famous by the film and book (*The Longest Day*) over the English stretch of beach.


The sudden withdrawal of German fighters is all the more remarkable when one considers that the Allied invasion originally took place on 4/5 November.

1 Hrowe H. SAUNDERS, *The Victory Betrayed*, Druffel, Leoni 1984, p. 152.

2 Cornelius RYAN, »The Longest Day«, in: *Secret Command Matter. Behind the Scenes of World War II*, Vol. 2, Das Beste 1965, p. 389.

3 John WEAL, *Focke-Wulf FW 7 90 Aces of the Western Front*, Osprey Aircraft of the Aces No. 9, Osprey reprint 1998 p. 71 f. ,

The well-known Chinese model building company ›Dragon‹ dedicated their model of the Focke-Wulf 190 A-8 (1/48) to the epic flight of the two individual FW 190s of the JC 26 under the command of ›Pips‹ PRILLER against the entire invasion force on 6 June 1944. This was all that was realized – or was allowed to be realized! – of the carefully prepared German plans for a large-scale operation of the Luftwaffe on the day of the invasion.



June 1944 was to take place. On June 5, a large part of the Anglo-American landing fleet had already left the English ports. However, because of the rough seas in the canal, the ships had to turn back to seek refuge in the harbors. On the day of the invasion, the ground units of 1st and 2nd Group, which were absolutely necessary for an effective deployment of Jagdgeschwader 26, were in the middle of the transfer march into the interior of France: the vehicles of 1st Group were on their way to Reims, and the 3rd Group was driving in that direction Nancy. Luckily, Commodore PRILLER managed to reach and stop the four marching convoys by radio. It was only after several telephone calls to the headquarters of the 5th Fighter Division that PRILLER got the decision from there as to where his squadron should move to: After a stopover at the sites of JG 2 ›Richthofen‹ in Creil and Corneilles – that was where the fighter planes of JG 26 meanwhile collected on its own initiative – it was to be transferred to airfields in the Paris area far from the front on June 7th.



Joseph PRILLER.

On June 7, 1944, the British newspaper *The Guardian* reported: 'Given the extreme importance of repelling our invasion to the German High Command, it had been expected that air supremacy over the coast would be hotly contested, but so far it has not been the case. Allied air supremacy is superior and unchallenged.'

The other 'Stammgeschwader' on the Channel coast, JG 2 'Richthofen' under Major Kurt BÜHLIGEN, also suffered from similarly strange circumstances shortly before the start of the invasion.

Only days before landing, the powerful III./JG 2 had to leave Corneilles airfield and was now in Brittany, while its ground parts were still on the transfer march to La Rochelle. II. JG 2 was stationed at Creil near Paris, and only 1. Gruppe, badly battered by the battle for Anzio (Italy), remained stationed at Corneilles-en-Vexin airfield, which at 60 kilometers was the closest to the landing front.

These actions, which can only be explained by extreme stupidity or deliberate sabotage, meant that on the decisive day of the invasion there were fewer German fighters on the canal than when defending against the insignificant small landing at Dieppe in 1942.

General JUNCK was relieved as commander of II Jagdkorps on July 1, 1944. He was allowed to retire from Air Force service. He joined Kurt TANK's Focke-Wulf staff as an advisor. A secure post to survive the end of the war, having been involved in the 'great state development'?

Misleading reconnaissance flights in early June 1944

On June 5, 1944, Field Marshal ROMMEL stated in his weekly report on the situation to his boss, Field Marshal VON RUNDSTEDT :